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THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: A SAMPLING OF ADVOCACY
JoHN E. MtnRAY,

JR.*

Q N THE afternoon of January 28, 1960, the third speaker at the Twelfth
Annual Meeting of the Section on Antitrust Law of the New York State
Bar Association delivered a talk entitled, "Provisions and Provisos of the
Robinson-Patman Act-A Literal Legislative Lexicon."' For those who were
unable to attend the meeting, the speaker's remarks were reduced to print2
so that the talk joins the already bulging ranks of articles dealing with the
Robinson-Patman Act. 3 Whether it will be remembered as just another
Robinson-Patman article or rather as a penetrating analysis developing the
crucial underlying problem which must be remedied in relation to the Act is
the question which the present writing attempts to answer. If the author of
"Provisions and Provisos" is correct in his analysis of the central problem and
in his suggestion of a preliminary step in remedying the problem, that glorious
day when businessmen and their counsel look upon the Act as an "... . antitrust measure directed against the abuses of market domination ' 4 is no longer
an illusion.
The Problem
According to the author, the central problem concerns the interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act by the Federal Trade Commission. More
specifically, the following thesis is spelled out:
(1) The Commission construes prohibitory provisions quite broadly but
construes exempting provisos quite narrowly.
(2) The Commission interprets the language of the Act literally when it is
necessary to do so to hold certain conduct as violative of it, but interprets
other language quite broadly when the "vicissitudes of litigation so require."5'
To "strikingly" demonstrate the validity of this thesis, the principal
vehicle used is the analysis of four recent cases in which various provisions and
provisos of the Act are discussed. 6 One of these cases had reached the United
* B.S. 1955, La Salle College, Phila. Pa., LL.B., The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C., 1958; S.J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1959; member of Wisconsin Bar.
Ass't. Prof. of Law, Duquesne Univ. School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1960.
1. The speaker was Edgar E. Barton of the firm of White & Case.
2. Barton, Provisions and Provisos, CCH Antitrust Law Symposium, New Theories
of Federal Trade Commission Enforcement, 94 (1960), hereinafter referred to as Symposium.
3. See, Twenty Years of Robinson-Patman Literature, 1936-1956 (Special Reference
List No. 4, rev. 1957), compiled by the Federal Trade Commission Library.
4. Dommissee, The Regulation of Retail Trade Competition, 55 (1939).
5. Symposium, 96.
6. F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., (Dkt. 6331), order set aside 265 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1959), cert. granted 361 U.S. 880 (1959); F.T.C. v. Henry Broch & Co. (Dkt. 6484),
order set aside 261 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. granted 360 U.S. 908 (1959) ; F.T.C. v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., (Dkt. 6221), order set aside 258 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Matter of Liggett Co., Inc., (Dkt. 6642) (Sept. 9, 1959).
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States Supreme Court at the time of the address 7 whereas two others have
reached the high court subsequently8 and the third has not been appealed.9
To bulwark his thesis, the author makes incidental use of the cost justification defense of Section 2 (a) of the Act which is not only available as a subject
of condemnation by itself' ° but is also helpful in criticizing the Act generally
2
or the Federal Trade Commission.1
Invariably, discussions of the Robinson-Patman Act begin with the observation that the statute is ineptly and ambiguously phrased. After a relatively
mild characterization ("this abstruse act"' 3), the author returns to the normal
pattern. In relation to Section 2(e) he suggests, "It has long been recognized
that section 2(e) is the classic illustration of the plumber's job that was done
4
by the legislative draftsmen in connection with the Robinson-Patman Act."'
Shortly thereafter in referring to the language of the statute, the "infelicitous"
label of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is adopted. 15
It would seem to be more polemical than fruitful to reiterate the fact that
the Act is poorly drafted since virtually all who are students of it would agree
with this observation. 16 Yet, it should not be forgotten that "... . critics sometimes bark up the wrong tree and criticize the Act for how it reads when they
7
really mean that they do not like what it says."'
In any event, Congress, the FTC, the courts and the lawyers have
had twenty-four years to straighten out the quirks, iron out the
wrinkles, and make sense out of its confusion and ambiguities. Having
failed to do so, it is somewhat unfair to blame the deceased Senator
Robinson, the very much alive Congressman Patman, and H. B.
Teegarden, counsel for the Wholesale Grocers Association, who is
popularly credited, or discredited, depending on the point of view, with
having drafted the Act, for the difficulties engendered by it.'8
7.

Simplicity, 360 U.S. 55 (1959).

8. Henry Broch, 363 U.S. 166 (1960); Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
9. Liggett, Dkt. 6642.
10. See, e.g., Rowe, Cost justification of Price Differentials Under the RobinsonPatman Act, 59 Colum.L. Rev. 584 (1959).
11. See, e.g., Austern, Tabula in Naufragio-Administrative Style, Some Observations
on the Robinson-Patman Act, CCH Robinson-Patman Symposium 105 (1953); Rowe,
Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60
Yale LJ.929 (1951).
12. "I have a hunch that most discussion of the cost aspects of the Robinson-Patman
Act have degenerated into 'Hate the FTC' sessions ...." Massel, Introduction to Meeting
on Cost justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 1 Antitrust Bull. 559, 560 (1956).
13. Symposium, 94.
14. Symposium, 95.
15. Symposium, 96.
16. Referring to the "incredibly inept draftsmanship" of the Act, one writer recently
suggested that, "It is difficult to find a commentator on the Robinson-Patman Act who has
not made this charge against its draftsmanship." Bevoise, The Problems of Local and
Foreign Business, CCH Antitrust Law Symposium, How to Comply With the Clayton Act,
152, 161 (note 20) (1959).
17. Stedman, Twenty-Four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Wis. L. Rev.
197, 198.
18. Ibid.
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Before the case analysis begins, the reader is quickly escorted through
the labyrinthine provisions and provisos in somewhat less than objective
fashion. For example, the portraits of the three affirmative defenses found
in the statutory language are painted with the familiar brush of despair:
(1) Cost Justification. "... almost useless as a practical matter;' 9
(2) Changing Market Conditions. "...
this proviso likewise has been of
no use to a prospective respondent;" 20
(3) Meeting Competition in Good Faith, as to whether it is applicable
to section 2 (d) as well as section 2 (e). ". . . we can only speculate as to how
this issue would be viewed by a majority of the Commission now or later."2'
It is remarkable that the reader, after this brief sojurn, is optimistic
enough to continue the journey. If he does continue, the main proof of the
author's thesis is submitted to him through the case analysis.
22
I. ANHEUSER BUSCH

As presented in the article under review, the statement of facts in the
Ankeuser case is a remarkable manifestation of the advocate's point of view. 2 3
In order to emphasize the contrast between the advocate's presentation of the
facts and the Commission's statement, it is worthwhile to briefly summarize
them.
Advocate:24 This case involves a national seller of beer accounting for
about 7% of national beer sales. Its product is sold at various prices in many
markets depending upon the local competitive situation, freight cost from the
brewery, taxes, etc. In a period of drastically falling sales on a national basis,
it temporarily reduced prices in its home market, St. Louis, Missouri, so as to
recoup part of its losses and to arrest the sales decline. The competitors of the
respondent in the St. Louis area are all substantial companies doing business
over a large area and one of them, Falstaff, is the fourth largest brewer in the
country. There were no sales below cost as a result of the price reduction.
The only result was that Anheuser temporarily gained some sales in the St.
Louis market, but much less than its total national losses, while its competitors
accounted for somewhat less of the same market during the period.
On these bare facts, the Commission found that Anheuser violated section
2(a) of the Act because it reduced its prices in St. Louis and did not reduce
them elsewhere and, according to the Commission, as a consequence diverted
business to it from its competitors.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Busch.
24.

Symposium, 94.
Symposium, 95.
Symposium, 96.
Op. cit.
supra, notes 6 and 8.
This should not be considered unusual since Mr. Barton was counsel for AnheuserSymposium, 97.
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Commission:2 5 Throughout the country the respondent's product, Budweiser, is generally sold at some higher price than beers of local or regional
distribution. At the time of the price reductions respondent was the largest
brewer in the country. As a result of two price reductions, the previously
existing price differential between the respondent's product and the product of
its St. Louis competitors of 58 cents per statistical case2 was extinguished.
During the period of the full price reduction, respondent held the first place
position in the St. Louis market which it had acquired as a result of the
reduction, having risen from fourth position prior to the reduction. During
this period, the total market sales in St. Louis increased only about 9.2% as
against the same period for the preceding year. Respondent enjoyed an increase of 201.5%, a tripling of sales while 2 of the 3 regional competitors saw
their sales fall 41% and one-third. Falstaff, which had been gaining in sales
prior to the reduction, suffered losses.
Taking into account all of the factors which may have affected the sales
of the various competitors in the St. Louis market, it is evident that only
respondent's price reductions could have had such a general adverse effect
on the market.
While much more could be added to the Commission's statement, the
brief summary set forth suffices to present the contrasting picture of the facts.
On appeal in the 7th Circuit,27 Judge Schnackenberg's opinion did not
reach the hotly contested issues of injury to competition or meeting competition in good faith. The court found an impasse in the Commission's definition
of "discrimination." Adopting the language of Representative Utterback which
had been severly criticized for several years prior to this case,28 the court
decided that,
Where two purchasers from a seller are competing with each other,
that competition creates a relationship that entitles them to comparable
treatment as to price, without which treatment there would be a discrimination in price within the meaning of 2(a). On the other hand,
in a case like this, where the purchasers from a seller are located in
different areas of the country and are not in competition with each
other, there is generally no relationship which entitles them to be
charged the same price.2 9
In effect, the 7th Circuit's position was based on the theory that "different purchasers" meant "competing purchasers" in the statutory language.
25. CCH Trade Reg. Rep., Transfer Binder (FTC Complaints, Orders, Stipulations,
1957-1958), 26, 705 (1957).
26. A statistical case is the equivalent of the standard 24/12 oz. case.
27. 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959).
28. See Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the RobinsonPatman Act (2nd rev. ed. 1959), 18 et seq. Mr. Austin was equally critical of the Utterback definition in his earlier (1954) edition.
29. 265 F.2d 677, 681-682 (7th Cir. 1959).
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Shortly thereafter, the 10th Circuit noted this interpretation but expressly
refused to apply any such restriction to section 2 (a).30
The Supreme Court reversed the 7th Circuit indicating that "...
a price
discrimination within the meaning of that provision is merely a price difference."' As to the Utterback definition relied upon by the 7th Circuit, the
Court said, ". . . the primary function of statutory construction is to effectuate
the intent of Congress, and that function cannot properly be discharged by reliance upon a statement of a single Congressman, in the face of weighty counter32
vailing considerations which are present in this case."
In relation to the question of proof necessary to show a case of territorial
price discrimination, the author describes the FTC's position as ". . . an
excellent example of the Commission's current proclivity for broadly construing
the prohibitory part of section 2(a)." 33 The descriptive adjective "current"
was used to describe the Commission's "proclivity" because of the 1954 General
Foods case3 4 which, the reader is told, "... struck a blow for hard rather than
soft competition. . . ."35 In that case, the Commission did not find a violation
of 2(a) where a respondent which accounted for more than 60% of the national
pectin market reduced its prices in the western territory (west of the Rocky
Mountains) but maintained its higher prices in the East. On the other hand,
Anheuser-Busch accounted for only about 7% of national sales and when this
small seller reduced prices in only one market to recoup much greater losses
nationally, the Commission suggests that this violates the Act.
It would seem that the Commission vacillated if one were to ignore the
relevant facts that distinguish General Foods from Ankeuser. Both cases
involved alleged injuries to primary-line (seller) competition and discriminations can be found in both cases. But, in order to violate 2(a), more than a
discrimination which is a mere difference in prices must be found; there must
be an injury to competition3 6 which the Commission could not find in General
Foods because the sales of the respondent's competitors which were allegedly
injured showed significant increases during the period of the "deals" in the
Western territory. This led the hearing examiner to conclude that competition
in that industry, including the western portion of the country, was active
and virile. The same statement could not be made in relation to the St. Louis
market for beer during the period of the price reductions by Anheuser.
30. Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 955

(loth Cir. 1959).

31. 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
32. Id. at 553.
33. Symposium, 98.
34. In the Matter of General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885 (1954).
35. Symposium, 99.
36. But see, F.T.C. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510
F.T.C., 148 F.2d 378 (1945); Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co.,
These are all 2nd Circuit cases where the rule seems to be that the
a prima facie case when it shows that the respondent has charged
the sale of goods of like grade and quality.

(1951); Moss, Inc. v.
240 F.2d 457 (1957).
Commission makes out
two different prices in
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The author feels that the Commission will find a price discrimination in
a territorial price case if it can show ". . . any difference in price plus some
showing of loss of sales by competitors. .. ,,13This would indicate that the
Commission has completely nullified the effect of the word "substantially" as
found in the broad proscription of 2(a). If this were the case, there would
certainly be a departure from precedent since the Commission has maintained
that the Act requires substantial, not trivial or sporadic, interference with
competition in order that a violation be establisheda 8 There is nothing in the
Anheuser case which would indicate that the Commission has ignored the
"substantial" criterion.
More important than this argument are the criteria which the author
would set forth as necessary to find a violation of 2(a) in a territorial price
case: (1) sales below cost; (2) the destruction of a single competitor by the
price reduction; (3) a demonstrated intent on the part of the defendant to
injure the single competitor before liability is found. These criteria are based
on cases involving territorial price discriminations 0 and the author would
apparently make such findings part of the prima facie case of either the Commission in an FTC proceeding or a plaintiff in a private treble damage action.
While it is true that the stock example of price discrimination involving injury
to primary-line competitors is local price cutting which a seller having a wide
distribution engages in for the purpose of eliminating a local competitor, it is a
non sequitur to suggest that the Commission or a plaintiff should be denied
relief when the circumstances surrounding the violation are somewhat less
obvious. Indeed, it would seem that the author would go to the opposite
extreme of that which he accuses the Commission of advocating; i.e., he would
construe prohibitory provisions quite narrowly. The suggestions of the author
would effectively emasculate the proscriptions of 2(a) if they were adopted by
the Commission.
To be sure, if a national concern adopts a policy of first reducing
prices in one area to drive out competition with that result and then
in another area to do the same thing, a good case could be made for
the proposition that such conduct should be proscribed .... However,
when as in the Anheuser-Busch case, the different prices in different
markets merely reflect normal business purposes, and are in fact the
very epitome of competition, it may be doubted whether any public
purpose
is served by the Commission seeking to thwart such compe40
tition .
Here, the author would initially suggest that the reduction of prices in
37. Symposium, 99.
38. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. F.T.C. 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. dismissed 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
39. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Porto Rican American
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. den. 279 U.S.
858 (1929) ; Maryland Baking Co. v. F.T.C., 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957).
40. Symposium, 100.
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local areas with the intent of driving out competition should be proscribed.
The Director of the Bureau of Litigation of the FTC, Joseph E. Sheehy, illuminates this suggestion. In answer to the question, "Is evidence of predatory
intent essential in an area price discrimination case?" Mr. Sheehy replied:
No. But from my experience I am of the opinion that it will be
present in practically every instance and we, of course, shall put in the
available evidence on this point. It is of special importance in establishing that the lower price was not
made in "good faith" to meet the
41
equally low price of a competitor.
If predatory intent is not essential, is it not unjust to proscribe activity
which reflects "normal business purposes?" The presumption herein is that
the activities of Anheuser-Busch do reflect normal business purposes. Unquestionably, many businessmen would agree that these purposes were normal
but this is only another manifestation of the differences between the standards
of the business community and the standards as set forth in the Act. What is
'"normal" for a businessman is not necessarily legal and the activities of
Anheuser-Busch in reducing its prices in St. Louis to recoup national losses
are proscribed by the Act whether the business community feels that such
activities are normal or not. Can there be any doubt that there is little
sympathy for the purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act among businessmen
and their counsel? The remedy which is actually being sought here is the
outright repeal of the Act which should be sought in a legislative context
rather than in a judicial one.
Before leaving the first of the four cases which supposedly demonstrate his
thesis, the author turns to the construction by the Commission of the "meeting
competition" proviso which neither the 7th Circuit nor the Supreme Court
reached. Because of the premium status of the respondent's product, "Budweiser," the Commission found that when the price per case was reduced to
exactly match the prices of the three regional competitors in the St. Louis
market, this was not a case of meeting competition in good faith but was, in
effect, an undercutting of a competitor's price. This construction is criticized
because there is nothing in the legislative history to support it and because
the Commission is put in the paradoxical position of holding that the same
42
price is not the same price.
A literal reading of Section 2(b) would permit the price reductions found
in the Ankeuser case. Can there be any doubt, however, that if a seller of a
premium product is permitted to eliminate price differentials between his
premium product and his competitor's non-premium product, this undercuts
competition just as effectively as permitting the seller to undercut the price of
a product which sells for the same price as his own? This is not a novel con41. Sheehy, Current Developments Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Washington
Univ. L.Q. 62, 64 (1960).
42. Symposium, 100.
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struction of 2(b). In 1948, the Commission held that a reduction in the price
of a premium product to that of a non-premium product was not meeting competition in good faith. 43 In 1950, the Commission again referred to the
"superior public acceptance" of the respondent's premium product in its decision not to permit the utilization of the "good faith" defense.44
All of the polemics concerning the reading of 2(b) in connection with the
"superior public acceptance" doctrine ignore the crux of the defense. Noting
the fact that the defense has a more restricted meaning under the RobinsonPatman amendment than under old section 2 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme
Court said,
None of these changes, however, cut into the actual core of the defense. That still consists of the provision that wherever a lawful lower
price of a competitor threatens to deprive a seller of a customer, the
seller, to retain that customer, may in good faith meet that lower
price. 45 (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, Commissioner Tait expressed the same thought:
"The justification provided by Section 2 (b) for discrimination in price contrary
to the provisions of Section 2(a) is essentially a right of self-defense against
competitive price attacks.1 46 If this element of economic self-defense is not
present, the good faith element in the defense cannot be shown and, thus, this
affirmative defense is not available. In the instant case, the conduct of the
respondent was offensive, i.e., the price reductions were made when the respondent's share of the St. Louis market was increasing. While it may be true
that its national market was decreasing, this is no justification for attempting
to recoup losses in the market where gains instead of losses are found by
charging discriminatory prices which substantially lessen competition in that
market. To hold otherwise would be to countenance a form of predatory price
cutting.
Apparently, the author would have been satisfied with a literal reading of
the 2(b) proviso by the Commission. Instead, the Commission's interpretation of it allegedly ".... demonstrates the myopia with which the Commission
views the clearly stated exculpatory provisos in Robinson-Patman. ' 47 Perhaps
the most astonishing aspect of this observation is that any part of the RobinsonPatman Act is "clearly stated." Thus, the Commission's interpretation of this
exempting clause does not fall within the first principle of the author's thesis
43. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 396 (1948); rev'd. on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
44. Standard Brands, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 1485 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.
1951). See, Note, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 567, 569-570, to the effect that the Commission has
not departed from the literal meaning of the phrase "equally low price" as found in the
statutory language; see note 68, infra.
45. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1951). But,
see The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
184 (1955).
46. Op. cit. supra, n.25 at pp. 36, 331.

47. Symposium, 100.
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noted supra. This must be one of those instances where the Commission interprets language quite broadly when the "vicissitudes of litigation so require."
A more objective view of the record, however, discloses that the Commission
has maintained flexible standards in interpreting Section 2(b), not because of
the "vicissitudes of litigation," but rather because ". . . the heart of the matter
is whether actual competition, not merely a nominal price quotation, is equalized."' 48 In choosing Anheuser, it would have been difficult for the author to
find a better case to demonstrate the fallacy of his thesis.
49
II. HENRY BROCH & Co.

In the Broch case, the Commission found a violation of Section 2 (c) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, the brokerage section. The respondent, a broker
for various food companies, agreed to act for one of these firms for a 5% commission. A buyer, Smucker, wished to purchase apple concentrate from this
firm and offered a lower price than the seller was willing to accept through a
second broker. The respondent was negotiating with Smucker at about the
same time. The seller told the respondent that the price to Smucker could be
reduced only through a brokerage cut from 5% to 39. The respondent agreed
to accept the smaller commission and the reduced price was granted to Smucker
on the immediate sale as well as on subsequent sales even though all other
customers paid the customary brokerage fee of 5%. The Commission issued a
cease-and-desist order against the respondent which was set aside by the 7th
Circuit in an opinion written by Judge Schnackenberg. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari5" and in June, 1960, reversed the 7th Circuit in a five-to-four
decision.
The Brock case allegedly"... presents another example of the Commission's
propensity for broadening the prohibitory sections of the Robinson-Patman Act
and to depart from the literal terms of the statute when it is expedient to do
so ..
-51 In his brief treatment of this case which adopts the opinion of the
7th Circuit, the author's observations can be reduced to three principal points
of advocacy:
(1) The Commission's motive in bringing this action was that of obliging
the brokers so as to insulate them from competition which would erode the
amount of their commissions.
(2) In bringing the action under 2(c), the Commission sought to avoid
the use of the affirmative defenses of cost justification and meeting competition
in good faith which would have been available under a 2(a) or 2(f) charge.
Thus, 2(c) was merely utilized as a pleading device which casts some doubts
upon the integrity of the body of responsible experts which the Commission
is supposed to be.
48. AGNC Rept., op. cit. supra, n.45 at 183.
49. Op. cit. supra, notes 6 & 8.
50. 360 U.S. 908 (1959).
51.

Symposium, 100-101.
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(3) "If a seller is to be forbidden to meet competition by reducing the
amount to be paid to the broker, then to that extent his costs are frozen without
regard for the welfare of the public which must ultimately defray the resultant
52
cost of distribution."
Before considering these three points, it should be noted that the respondent would have received $2,036.84 if it had insisted upon the full commission of 5%. At the rate of 3%, the amount actually received by the
respondent was $1,222.11. If the respondent had actually paid the difference
of $814.73 to the buyer, Smucker, i.e., if it had split its commission with the
buyer or passed this amount along to the buyer in the form of advertising
allowances or promotion services, there would have been a violation of 2(c)
without question.5 3 In reducing the amount of its commission to Smucker
alone, the respondent never received the $814.73 which it would have received
from another customer who would have been required to pay the full commission. Considering the broad language of Section 2(c), the fact that it is the
most ambiguous and faultily drafted section of the Act, 54 and the precedent
of strict interpretation of this section,5 5 it would seem that the Commission's
interpretation was not unusual.
As to the first of the three points, it is difficult to find any evidence to
support the suggestion that the Commission's motive was to oblige the brokerage profession. A more reasonable argument is that the Commission sought to
protect the competitors of Smucker, the buyer, rather than the brokers. When
the case reached the Supreme Court,56 the dissenting opinion written by Mr.
57
Justice Whittaker suggested that this was the "real concern" of the majority.
Secondly, if the action was brought by the Commission under 2(c) to
avoid the affirmative defenses which would have been available had the action
been brought under 2(a), the reader is left with the inevitable question, why?
The casuistry involved herein is that the author maintains that the affirmative
defenses are virtually worthless. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that
either of these defenses could have been utilized by the respondent in the
instant case.58 As to the author's remarks in relation to the "type of integrity"
52.

Symposium, 102.

53. Op. cit. supra, n.28 at 116.
54. Id. at 106.
55. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Herzog, 150 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1945); Southgate Brokerage
Co. v. F.T.C., 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1946); Biddle
Purchasing Co. v. F.T.C., 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
Also see, Oliver Bros., Inc. v. F.T:C., 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. F.T.C., 106 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940),
and Quality Bakers of America v. F.T.C., 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940). judge Schnackenberg's 7th Circuit opinion distinguishes the latter 3 cases on the following tenuous ground:
"Each of these cases involved buyers' purchasing agents who were charged with receiving
brokerage commissions from the sellers, which they passed on to the buyers." 261 F.2d 725,
728 (7th Cir. 1958).
56. This case marked the first time the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret
the ambiguous language of Section 2(c).
57. 363 U.S. 166, 184 (1960).
58. Though this is true in the instant case, there is a strong argument that the defense
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which this "pleading device" suggests, there is nothing in the article to support
this observation.
The third point raised by the author was the principal concern of the 7th
Circuit in the Brock case: "Respondent's interpretation of Section 2(c) would
actually promote price rigidity and uniformity contrary to the national antitrust policy." 59 Perhaps the brokerage clause should be reconsidered in the
light of national antitrust policy6" but this consideration should take place in
a legislative context rather than in a judicial one. As the Supreme Court noted
in the instant case, "Any doubts as to the wisdom of the economic theory embodied in the statute are questions for Congress to resolve."'" If the decision
of the 7th Circuit had prevailed, the effect would have been ". . . to allow a
practice very similar to secret rebates, uniformly condemned where they lack
any economic justification. Such a result may be avoided by a careful legislative committee which does not need to wait for the proper fact situation to
62
effectuate good law."
III.

SnI'LICITY PATTERN 0 3

Though the break with precedent lasted for little more than one year,
the instant case will be remembered as one which was noteworthy. 04 The
Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint against the respondent, Simplicity, charging it with a violation of Section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.615 The respondent charged uniform prices for its dress patterns but supplied its larger customers, the Red Fronts (variety stores), with free monthly
counter catalogues and certain storage cabinets, while the smaller customers,
the fabric shops, were-required to pay for the same or similar items. One of
the principal issues in the case involved the cost justification defense:
Mr. Simon: Judge, do I understand that if evidence were offered
and Mr. Smith would not object and it would be received in evidence
on cost justification, that you would still not hold it was a defense to
an answer under 2 (e) ?
should be available for worthy respondents. See Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law,
100-102 (1959). This is something, however, which should not occur through judicial lawmaking.
59.

261 F.2d 725, 729 (7 Cir. 1958).

60. See, e.g., Edwards, op. cit. supra, n.58; also, see Adelman, The Consistency of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 5 (1953).
61.

363 U.S. 166, 177 (1959).

62. Note, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 961, 965 (1959).
63. Op. cit. supra, notes 6 & 7.
64. E.g., see 26 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 128 (1958); 72 Harv. L. Rev. 385 (1958);

68 Yale LJ. 808 (1959).
65. The Commission also charged the respondent with a violation of Section 5 of
the Fed. Trade Com. Act, which charge was later dismissed. Section 2(e) of the Act reads

as follows:
That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser
against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with

or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing
to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms
not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
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Hearing Examiner Pack: Yes, sir. That is correct. I don't understand
that the failure to object would affect the law in any way if the evidence should be received, and if I should continue to entertain the
views which I now hold, it seems to me the evidence would simply
have to be disregarded in the decision of the case. I do not understand that the reception of the evidence into the record, even without objection, would make any difference insofar as the law is concerned.
Mr. Simon: For the purpose of this record, Judge, may the record
show that you would hold that it was not a defense to an action
under 2 (e) ?
Hearing Examiner Pack: Yes, sir. 66
With few exceptions, the courts have generally indicated that the limitations of Section 2(a), including the cost defense, were not applicable to
other subsections. 67 The Court of Appeals in the instant case, however, held
that the defense of cost justification was applicable in a Section 2(e) proceeding. This result was reached through a novel interpretation of Section
2(b) of the Act. 68 The Court reasoned that 2(b) contained language referring to 2(e) violations (services and facilities). The first clause of 2(b) has
been traditionally regarded as a procedural one, placing the burden of proof
upon the respondent to show justification. Which justification? Is the respondent limited to "meeting competition in good faith" or are other justifications possible? The Court held that other justifications are possible depending upon "... the facts in a particular case." 69 Thus, the use of cost justification
was possible not because it is stated in 2(a) but rather because it is one
of the justifications which "Congress . . . must have intended

. . ."

to be

available to fact situations similar to those in the instant case.70
Since the Court referred to "congressional intent" several times in its
opinion, it is puzzling why it did not make better use of the available materials
to ascertain the significance of the inclusion of "services or facilities" in 2(b).
66. 258 F.2d 673, 680 (D.C. 1958).
67. See, Biddle Purchasing Co. v. F.T.C., 96 F.2d 687 (24d Cir. 1938) holding that
the 2(a) requirement for injury to competition was not a requirement for a violation of
2(c). In Oliver Bros., Inc. v. F.T.C., 102 F.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939), the Court said
that it could see no reason to read into sections (c), (d) and (e)the limitations contained in 2(a). In Elizabeth Arden Inc. v. F.T.C., 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert
denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947), the Court refused to read 2(a) limitations into 2(e).
68. Section 2(b) of the Act reads as follows:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that
there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden
of rebutting the prima fade case thus made by showing justification shall be
upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification
shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order
terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, that nothing herein contained
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima fade case thus made by showing that
his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,
or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
69. 258 F.2d 673, 681 (D.C. 1958).
70. Ibid.
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If it had, it might have found that ". . . 2(b)'s seeming allusion to 2(d) and
7
2(e) stems from an inadvertent drafting error." '
In its unanimous reversal of the D. C. Circuit, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Clark, relied upon two main elements: (1)
the key word "justification" in Section 2(b) cannot be read so as to allow
more methods of rebuttal than the one which Congress expressly made available, to wit, meeting competition in good faith. "We cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted." 7 2 (2) The more compelling reasoning suggested
in the opinion would seem to connote a concept as old as the Court itself:
Entirely aside from the fact that this Court is not in a position to
review the economic wisdom of Congress, we cannot say that the
legislative decision to treat price and other discriminations differently is without rational basis. In allowing a 'cost justification' for
price discriminations and not for others, Congress could very well
have felt that sellers would be forced to confine their discriminatory practices to price differentials, where they could be more
readily detected and where it would be much
easier to make accurate
73
comparisons with any alleged cost savings.
There are two major points made by the author in relation to the Simplicity case: (1) ". . . it is not apparent how it is any easier to make accurate comparisons of cost savings in connection with price discriminations
than it is with respect to services and facilities." 74 This is the unanswered
question, to wit, if it is assumed that cost justification could be utilized in a
2(e) proceeding, how would the defense be applied in such a situation? If
seller X sells goods of like grade and quality to buyers Y and Z and the cost
of serving Y is actually $2,000 less than the cost of serving Z, should X be
entitled to supply Y with $2000 worth of services and facilities? The answer
depends upon the basis that is to be used in determining the amount to be
supplied. If the cost to X is to be used, then Y is entitled to the amount of
services and facilities which X can supply at a cost to X of $2,000. But, if
X is a large manufacturer, it is possible that the same quantity for which X
pays $2,000 may cost Y or Z $4,000, thus assuring Y of twice the competitive
advantage over Z to which Y is actually entitled because of cost savings. If
the basis used was the cost of services and facilities to each of X's customers,
it would be prohibitively difficult to estimate the cost to each of X's customers.
Thus, it should be apparent that it is easier to make accurate cost comparisons
in relation to price differentials than it would be with reference to services and
facilities.
(2) The author suggests that "...
in view of the anti-competitive nature
of the whole Robinson-Patman Act, it would have been desirable for the Court
71.
72.
73.
74.

Comment, 68 Yale LJ. 808, 814-816 (1959).
360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959).
Id. at 67-68.
Symposium, 104.
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to maintain a degree of flexibility with respect to its [Section 2(b)'s] interpretation by not reading it so literally." It is important to notice the premise
in this argument: the "anti-competitive nature of the whole Robinson-Patman Act." This broad statement is not supported by the author. He permits
it to stand as a self-evident truth of which the reader is apparently supposed
to take judicial notice. Since June of 1936, however, Congress has been willing to allow this statute to remain on the books because price discrimination
is antithetical to the basic policy of maintaining competition. Why does price
discrimination abridge competition?
Price discrimination, economists have long observed, can be exercised
by a seller only when he has some degree of monopoly power or when
competition is substantially lessened or incomplete. In open markets
with price publicity a seller cannot ordinarily make some buyers pay
more than the 'going' price to other buyers for the same commodity.
The existence of price discrimination is thus a sign and an indicator
of some degree of monopoly or of incomplete competition. 75
Some economists are convinced that price discrimination is the sine qua
non of monopoly: 70 "A basic economic principle is that monopoly and price
discrimination are Siamese twins." 77 To answer the author's charge, a recent
statement by the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Earl W. Kintner, is appropriate: "I believe that, when fairly and effectively administered,
78
this statute is not anticompetitive in effect."1
The conclusion of this argument by the author, that the Court should
have read Section 2(b) less literally, is somewhat disconcerting for two reasons: (1) in relation to the Ankeuser case, the author apparently preferred
a literal reading of 2(b); (2) the author's thesis relates to the Commission's
interpretation of the statute rather than the Supreme Court's interpretation.
Notwithstanding this confusion, the question arises, why should the Court
75. Mund, Government and Business 182 (rev. ed. 1955).
76. "Price discrimination . . .is one of the most basic, versatile and deadly weapons
of economic aggression. Once sufficient control of the market has been attained to permit
its use, a monopolist can use a price discrimination to weaken or destroy competition,
penetrate new markets, attract additional customers, introduce new products, exploit noncompetitive sectors of the market, strengthen control over production and prices, deter
potential competition, and maximize profits * * * . . . price discrimination is the basic

weapon with which the monopolist hacks his way to power and then, having achieved
power, defends and preserves his imperium. It is an almost indispensable weapon;
monopoly can scarcely come to fruition or defend its market dominance without resort to
price discrimination. This truth is so universally recognized that one of the basic tenets
of all antimonopoly policy is the simple commandment: 'Thou shall not discriminate.'"
Testimony of Prof. Horace M. Gray, Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. Part II pp. 659.
77. Testimony of Prof. Vernon A. Mund, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, Id. at 644. But see, AGNC Rept., op. cit. supra, n.45 at 334 which would perform a
pygopagusotomy on the Siamese twins.
78. Kintner, The Role of Robinson-Patman in the Antitrust Scheme of Things: The
Perspective of Enforcement Officials, address before the ABA Section on Antitrust Law,
Wash., D.C. Aug. 30, 1960; FTC Release, 8/30/60 (p. 4).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

have interpreted the proviso less literally? The author's answer is that the
entire statute is anti-competitive in effect. But, is this for the Court to decide?
The Court itself has expressly refused to do so in Anhzeuser, Broch and Simplicity. It has refused, and rightly so, to inquire into the economic wisdom
of Congress.
IV.

70
LIGGETT & MYxRs TOBACCO COMPANY, INC.

The respondent is a manufacturer, seller and distributor of cigarettes and
other tobacco products, accounting for about 15% of the manufacture and sale
of cigarettes in the United States. In 1957, it had 5,902 accounts, 4,853 of

which were wholesalers, 355 retailers, 215 vending machine operators and the
balance consisting of institutions and military installations.
The respondent made payments to vending machine operators to induce
them to place the respondent's products in the machines. Similar payments
were not made, however, to wholesaler customers constituting about 80% of
the respondent's business. Thus, no payments were made to the 800,000
customers of the wholesalers. These customers were contacted periodically in
an effort to urge them to handle respondent's products. In addition, the missionary men of the respondent placed point of sale material in retailers' stores
and sold cigarettes to the retailers which the respondent's agents had purchased from the wholesalers. Some large buyers were served directly by the
respondent which buyers received various payments other than the payments
made to the vending machine customers.
A complaint was issued by the Commission charging the respondent with
a violation of Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act 80 in that it had, (1)
discriminated between the vending machine customers and the direct retailers;
(2) discriminated between direct retailers who received different promotional
allowances; (3) discriminated between the vending machine customers and
the wholesaler customers; (4) discriminated between the vending machine
customers and the "indirect customers" who bought from the wholesalers.
Hearing Examiner J. Earl Cox held that the respondent had violated
Section 2(d) with respect to charges (1) and (2) but specifically found that
2(d) was not violated with respect to charges (3) and (4).81 As to (3), the
Hearing Examiner determined that the vending machine customers were not in
79. Matter of Liggett Co., Inc., (Dkt. 6642), CCH Tr. Reg. Rep., Transfer Binder
(New FTC Complaints, Orders and Stipulations, 1959-1960), 28, 256 (1959).
80. Section 2 (d) of the Act reads as follows:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract
for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such
person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for
any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
81. FTC Dkt., 6642; initial decision filed Nov. 25, 1958.
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competition with the wholesaler customers. In relation to (4), he found that
the retailers purchasing from wholesalers or jobbers were not customers of the
respondent (so-called "indirect customers") within the meaning of Section
2(d). In an opinion by Commissioner Tait, the Commission affirmed the
82
essential findings of the Hearing Examiner.
In his analysis of the Liggett and Myers proceeding,8 3 the author merely
describes the initial decision and the affirmance of it by the Commission. His
displeasure with the decision, apparently, is the absence of more specific guides
in the Commission's opinion as to what constitutes an "indirect customer."
Along these lines, he suggests that it appears safe to conclude that in the absence of (1) fair trading activity on the part of the manufacturer which would
create a relationship between him and the ultimate retail outlets, (2) a policy
of regularly making drop shipments to retail customers of the wholesalers, or
(3) a measure of control by the manufacturer over the pricing policies of the
wholesaler in selling to retailers, a retail customer of the wholesaler will not be
held to be an "indirect customer" of the manufacturer.
Immediately following this "safe" conclusion, however, there is this
caveat: "However, given the proclivity which the Commission has for changing
its opinion regarding the effect of operative facts, I would not desire to write
84
an insurance policy on this."1
The reader is left with the question, How does this analysis of the case
demonstrate the author's thesis, "strikingly" or otherwise? There is no allegation that the Commission's interpretation of 2 (d) was unduly narrow or broad;
indeed, the author seemed to favor the interpretation of the "indirect customer"
question. He does suggest that the Commission is apt to change its mind in this
regard (which suggestion is not supported), but this does not relate to the
original thesis.
V.

COST JUSTIFICATION

Following the case analysis, the author spends a brief moment 8 5 on a
favorite target of Robinson-Patman critics, the cost justification defense. Lacking time to do a thorough job, he makes the general statement, ". . . suffice
it is to say that this proviso has been given basically the same niggardly treatment by the Commission as it has given the meeting competition proviso." 8 6
This broadside is followed by the usual cliches indicating that the cost proviso
is almost a dead letter because of: (1) the tremendous cost involved in preparing a case for trial in which the defense will be utilized, and (2) the
vagaries of its acceptance by the Commission. In addition, it is suggested
82. Op. cit. supra, n.79; Commissioner Kern dissented.
83. Symposium, 105-107.
84. Symposium, 107.
85. In his talk, the author indicated that he hoped to have more time to devote
to the cost defense (Symposium, 107).
86. Symposium, 107-108.
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that the cost defense has been completely successful in some cases but only
partially successful in others.
While an attempt has been made to analyze these and other classic observations elsewhere, 87 it is worthwhile to briefly suggest some of the reasons
why they may not be completely accurate.
As to the alleged tremendous cost of preparing the cost defense, it is true
that there are instances of excessive expenditures being devoted to such preparations. But the question must be asked, why has the cost been so high?
Respondents who have paid the high price to develop cost information invariably are engaged in a search for the proverbial needle in the haystack.
They have charged different prices for goods of like grade and quality without
any thought of the proscriptions of the Act. When their prices are attacked
by the Commission, they must engage ". . . high price talent to try to work
up quickly a cost defense of prices that had not been based on proper cost
information in the first place. . . .Therein lies the reason for the erroneous
contention that all R-P cost surveys are too expensive."8 8
The second observation which is not substantiated is best answered by
Corwin Edwards in his monumental work dealing with the entire Act: " .
it is reasonable to conclude that most of the difficulties of the cost defense are
due to the provisions of the statute and the limitations of cost accounting,
not the practices of the Federal Trade Commission. 8 9
Even in the successful cases involving cost justification, had it not been
for the liberal application of the de minimis0 rule by the Commission, many
of the respondents would have been adjudged violators of the Act. As to the
unsuccessful cases involving the defense, it has been observed that in many
of the cases the defense should fail since it is raised "...
in a desperate and
belated effort to beat the rap." 91
A final point in relation to cost justification is the allegation that some
of the cases have only been partially successful. This seems to be a common
misconception among the critics of the Act. 92 The cost defense is not a magic
device; the prerequisite for its use is the existence of cost differentials which
are greater than or equal to price differences. If such cost differences do not
3
exist, this fact should not detract from the defense as a vindicating device.
87. Murray, Cost justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Impossibility Revisited, 1960, Wis. L. Rev. 227 (1960).
88. Warmack, A Realistic Approach to Robinson-Patman Costing, Trade Practice
Annual, 11 (1954).
89. Edwards, op. cit. supra, n.58 at 611 (1959).
90. "De minimis non curat lex." The law will not fuss over trifles. This principle is
applied when a cost differential fails by a small amount in its attempt to justify a price
differential and the failure is so insignificant that no significant injury to competition
could possibly result.
91. Address by Prof. John C. Stedman, University of Wis. School of Law, before
the Wisconsin Bar Assn. Business Law Section, June 12, 1958.
92. See, e.g., Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1, 23 (note 101) (1956).
93. E.g., in relation to it the Minneapolis-Honeywell case, op. cit. supra, nA3, Prof.
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It is possible that the author's views on cost justification are not as universal as they were heretofore. There are some indications that businessmen
are becoming conscious of distribution costs for managerial purposes which will
help to establish the cost defense if and when it is necessary.9 4 In addition, it
is now possible to read a law review article dealing with the Robinson-Patman
Act which speaks of cost justification in a favorable light.95
VI.

AUTHOR'S CONCLUSION

In summing up, the author admits that the Commission has the duty to
institute actions to test the outer limits of the statutory prohibitions found
in the Act. But, he qualifies this admission as follows:
However, under the present statutory scheme, the same men who
are charged with instituting the actions are also charged with the
ultimate responsibility of determining whether the charge is sufficient as a matter of law. It is unreasonable to expect that once a
complaint has been issued charging that a certain practice is a violation of a particular statute, that the Commission after protracted,
expensive hearings are held, will hold that the practice is not, as a
matter of law, violative of the statute.96
The suggested remedy for this anomalous situation is a separation of the
function of issuing complaints from the function of adjudicating comparable
to the change which took place in the NLRB as a result of the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act 97 which divested the Board of its
authority to issue complaints and delegated that function to the General
Counsel of the NLRB.

The author comments that ".

. it is generally

recognized that this division of functions has improved the administration of
the labor laws."

98

The origin of this suggestion dates back as far
ham's Case, the maxim was stated, "No man shall
cause." 9 9 But this only says that the argument is old;
vation emanates from one of the leading writers in
area:

as 1610 when, in Bonbe a judge in his own
a more important obserthe Administrative Law

Herbert F. Taggart in his book, Cost Justification 544 (1959) writes, "The absence of
adequate cost differences in certain brackets was doubtless distressing to the respondent,
but no reflection is thereby cast on the cost defense as a technique or as a provision of the
law."
94. Cost Control Helps Management Improve Marketing Efficiency and Build Profits,
Printer's Ink, July 4, 1958, p. 21.
95. "The cost justification defense, despite much argument and writing to the contrary,
has finally been developed by the Commission into a provision of meaning. The cases are
now only beginning to demonstrate, after more than 20 years, that it is not impossible
or unduly expensive to develop the facts where the defense is appropriate." Loughlin,
Investigation and Trial of Robinson-Patman Act Cases Before the Federal Trade Commission, 6 Antitrust Bull. 741, 768 (1959).
96. Symposium, 108.
97. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 153(d) (1947).
98. Symposium, 109.
99.

8 Co. 114a, lSa (1610).
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Perhaps in the case of the NLRB the disadvantages of complete
separation are not too high a price to pay for alleviating a widespread lack of confidence in the Board's fairness, whether or not that
lack of confidence has a sound foundation. Yet, perhaps the e.xperience counsels against extending the system of complete separation
to other agencies.' 00
It would certainly seem that the chaotic experience of the NLRB during
the first few years after the modification of the statute coupled with the fact
that the friction between Board and General Counsel since then has disappeared not because of the separation of functions but because of the lack
of differences of opinion (i.e., congenial personnel) does not recommend an
extension of this modification to other agencies.
More important than whether such a change should be made, however,
is the problem to which this preliminary remedy would be applied if the
author's views prevailed. There seems to be no relation between this remedy
and the interpretation of the statute by the Commission. The only a priori
judgment as a matter of law made by the Commission as it presently operates
is that if the allegations are proved, they will be sufficient as a matter of law.
If the General Counsel were to make this determination, it remains to be
demonstrated how this would significantly affect the interpretation of the
statute by the Commission. "But it may be sound to suggest that any adjudicator who is worth his salt can maintain the scales of justice in even balance
and still . ..authorize the institution of administrative proceedings."' 01
Another point in the author's conclusion is that ". . . under currently
102
prevailing doctrines, judicial review does not always remedy the situation."
If the author feels that there has been an abdication of judicial responsibility
in this area, it would seem that he has chosen the wrong cases to demonstrate
his point. In the three cases which were appealed, the Commission's orders
were set aside in all three. While the Supreme Court reversed the Courts of
Appeal, in one of the cases it did so by the narrowest possible margin. Perhaps judicial review does not always remedy the situation in favor of the
author's point of view. It certainly cannot be said, however, that in the
chosen cases there was-an absence of judicial review.
CONCLUSION

The article under review typifies the subjectivity of articles dealing with
the Robinson-Patman Act. The concepts found herein have been strewn
throughout legal and economic periodicals for the past twenty-five years.
The motive of the present writing is to point up the need for constructive and
objective thought in relation to the Act and its administration by the Commission. While it cannot be gainsaid that the Act has its imperfections, Chair100. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vol. 2, sec. 13.06, 213 (1958).

101. Id. at 239.
102.
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THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
man Kintner recently observed, ". . . if the statute is not perfect, it can be
improved, but first I believe the statute is entitled to a thoroughgoing and
meaningful test of its effectiveness which it has not yet received.' 0 3
Perhaps the first fact of life which some of the critics of the Act must
accept is its existence. The typical Robinson-Patman article -is an effort to
argue the merits of the Act itself but such argument is usually clothed in the
garb of how the Act reads or how it is being administered by the Commission.
This underlying issue is a matter for the economists and it would, therefore,
seem desirable to promote the joint efforts of lawyers and economists to perform a task which requires something more than an awareness of only one
discipline.
In answer to the original question which this writing attempts to answer,
to wit, whether the article under review will be remembered as a constructive
analysis of the problems which must be remedied in relation to the RobinsonPatman Act, or rather as just another Robinson-Patman article, the latter
conclusion seems inescapable.
103.

Op. dt. supra, n.78.

